Abstract -We assess the cost-reducing impacts of increasing stocks of ''high-tech'' equipment (O capital). Our empirical analysis is based on a dynamic production theory model and annual data for two-digit U.S. manufacturing industries . We find evidence of overinvestment in O capital in the mid to late 1980s, following a period of strong investment incentives in the late 1970s. By the end of the 1980s, however, the returns to investment and falling prices for O capital more than justified the high investment levels in nondurable-goods industries, and the benefit-cost ratio was also increasing for durable-goods industries. The underlying substitution patterns suggest that high-tech capital expansion increases demand for most capital and noncapital inputs overall, but saves on materials inputs. In durables industries, however, both energy and ''other'' capital appear somewhat substitutable with O capital, and in nondurables industries increasing high-tech intensity may be a factor underlying stagnating labor demand.
I. Introduction
T HE LAST two decades have witnessed an explosion in the amount of ''high tech'' computer power and information technology equipment purchased by American firms and businesses. Yet it has been difficult to establish whether the extent of such investments can be rationalized in terms of realized cost savings. In fact, a common perception is that this dramatic increase in office and information technology equipment has not had a commensurate impact on firms' cost and productivity performance. As Baily and Gordon (1988) described this situation, ''. . . official data show enormous productivity gains in the manufacture of computers, but apparently little productivity improvement in their use. '' 1 A fundamental concern in establishing the impact of investments in high-tech capital involves quantifying the costs and benefits of such investment, which requires capturing the linkages among capital and noncapital input use and output production. Precisely how one identifies and documents cost savings attained by high-tech investment is, however, problematic.
Within a given firm, for example, cost savings achieved in one division, line of business, or establishment might be offset by increased costs in another. This suggests that one might look for cost reductions at the overall firm level (although with mergers and acquisitions firm boundaries may be difficult to define), or even at the aggregate industry level (where overall patterns can be ascertained). In particular, industry-level analysis is appropriate for analyzing the global effects or social returns of these investments. Using data at this level of aggregation also facilitates a detailed cost analysis that would be precluded at the plant or firm level because of the lack of firm-or plant-level-specific prices. 2 Further, measurement of productivity and its determinants is more accurate for manufacturing than for nonmanufacturing industries, since inputs and outputs are more easily defined and measured. 3 Thus it is useful to explore the existence, magnitude, and determinants of cost savings from office and information technology equipment investment in manufacturing industries.
In this paper we empirically implement a cost-based production theory model to assess the motivation for and impacts of high-tech capital investment in two-digit U.S. manufacturing sectors. We explore potential cost savings by computing shadow values for office and information technology equipment, and comparing them to the associated investment costs and to analogous measures for other types of equipment. We then pursue this further through elasticities that allow us to evaluate the substitutability across different components of the capital stock, to examine the impact of high-tech investment on technical progress, and to quantify the effects of high-tech capital equipment on the demand for labor, energy, and materials inputs.
On balance we find that a surge in returns (compared to costs) of high-tech capital investment in the late 1970s was followed by a slump, indicating some overinvestment in the mid to late 1980s. However, the continued substantial investment in high-tech capital became more justifiable toward the beginning of the 1990s. Estimated marginal benefits (returns) and costs of such investment began to increase toward a balance. The decline in the benefit-cost ratio was particularly notable in durable-goods industries; the shortfall from 1 remained in the 1987-1991 period, even though the ratio increased to greater than 1 for nondurables. This indicates more ''sticky'' overinvestment in durablegoods industries, possibly associated with the greater substitutability between O and non-O capital, and the resulting adjustment costs. We also find that savings generated by high-tech capital investment arise largely from reductions of materials inputs.
II. Background
The observed explosion of high-tech and computer power in the past two decades has generated a great deal of discussion and analysis in lay, academic, and policy circles. Exploring these trends-and their determinants and effectsrequires first some specific information about this phenomenon. Some of the ''stylized facts'' regarding the capital intensity and composition of these capital components in U.S. manufacturing are evident from the measures reported in table 1.
We define high-tech equipment as a composite of office and information technology equipment (O), including office, computing, and accounting machinery, communications equipment, and scientific and engineering instruments. Equipment (E) is non-O durable equipment, and structures (S) is nonresidential structures (further discussion is provided below). In the first three columns of table 1, aggregate capital-output ratios for these capital components are presented by two-digit U.S. manufacturing industry for 1976, 1986, and 1991 , where both capital and output are in 1982 dollars, and aggregate K is a simple sum of stocks of E, S, and O.
These numbers indicate an upward trend in capital intensity in U.S. manufacturing. In 16 industries the capital intensity increased between 1976 and 1991, whereas it decreased in only four. On balance, across all industry sectors the weighted average (based on the industry share of total revenues) increased from 0.90 in 1976 to 0.99 in 1986 and then further to 1.006 in 1991. This trend is evident for both durable-and nondurable-goods industries, although on average durable-goods industries tend to have a slightly higher capital intensity.
This evidence contradicts the often noted constancy of capital intensity over time in the manufacturing sector. 4 It is, however, consistent with the common perception that manufacturing industries have undertaken substantial net investment and capital deepening in the recent past. It is also consistent with the recent concern that structural changes are occurring in U.S. manufacturing (possibly due to technological change or increased international competitiveness) that are biased against labor use (particularly less skilled labor). 5 The capital shares presented in the remaining columns of table 1 support the notion that at least part of this phenomenon arises from substantial changes in the composition of the aggregate capital stock from the 1970s to the mid-1980s. The extra investment that has been occurring has been heavily ''tipped'' toward high-tech investment, which is likely to substitute for other inputs such as less skilled labor, resulting in input-composition as well as capital-composition changes. 6 4 It is, in fact, contrary to the finding in an earlier version of this study of more constancy in the capital intensity numbers. This is in part due to the addition of more years of data (a slight decline in the mid-1980s following an increase in the 1970s is hidden here by the years reported), but it also is a result of changes in the treatment of the data on capital structures in the Bureau of Economic Analysis data to accommodate observed changes in the values of these stocks.
5 See Morrison and Siegel (1995a) and the references cited for more detail about this debate.
6 See Morrison and Siegel (1995a) for a discussion of technical change biases and this impact of increases in high-tech capital on employment patterns and stagnation in employment levels (especially for less educated laborers). 
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In particular, in every industry (except for petroleum, where it stayed the same) the (non-high-tech, E) equipment share of the aggregate capital stock fell between 1976 and 1991. This has primarily offset the increasing share of O equipment, which has typically been quite dramatic; the weighted average of the O shares increased by a factor of 5, from 3% to 15%. Certain industries experienced multiples of this rate of growth. In clay the O share increased from 1% to 24%, in furniture and fixtures from 1% to 13%, in instruments and printing and publishing from 2% to 26%, and in machinery from 6% to 32%. Although these numbers are remarkably consistent for durable-and nondurable-goods industries, at the end of the sample durable-goods industries were slightly more O-capital intensive, with an average O share of 18% as compared to 13% for nondurables.
The corresponding changes in the share of O in total investment is demonstrated in the first three columns of table 2, where mean values are reported for 1989-1991 (means are more representative since the yearly variations are large). These numbers show that the share of O investment in total capital investment at the end of our sample is even larger than the corresponding share of O in the total capital stock for every industry, so the growth trends in the stocks are being maintained. Moreover, in some industries (particularly durable-goods industries) the O share of total investment in the last three years of the sample is very large-even close to one-half (58% in clay, 65% in machinery, 44% in instruments, 48% in miscellaneous manufacturing, and 47% in printing and publishing)-and the share again is larger on average for durable-goods industries.
These changes in the composition of capital were induced not only by expected benefits (returns) resulting from technological change (and the associated substitution possibilities), but also by changes in relative input prices and their impact on substitution patterns. 7 To provide some insight about the contribution of prices, we present indexes of the relative prices of the different capital components in table 2, 8 where the discrepancies across capital assets arise from variations in depreciation (more rapid for high-tech capital) as well as in investment or asset prices (more decline for a given amount of ''effective'' capital for high-tech capital). 9 A clear pattern emerges from the consideration of these indexes. It is evident that the price of E capital has increased significantly (on average by more than a two-to-one ratio over the 15-year period between 1976 and 1991-from 0.162 to 0.366), whereas the price of O capital has actually 7 See Jorgenson and Stiroh (1993) for additional consideration of these issues.
8 These prices were computed using data from the productivity division of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and ex-ante capital rental cost formulas based on Harper et al. (1989) , as discussed later.
9 Although attempts to take these differences into account have been made in these data, and the more recent data (to 1991) more appropriately represent these phenomena than those used in earlier studies, some studies (such as Triplett (1989) ) have emphasized that published price indexes may still understate declines in price per effective capital unit for high-tech capital. 10 When these outliers are separated out, the average for the remaining industries is a change from 0.232 to 0.147, and the average for durable-goods industries is similar-0.224 to 0.164.
These price trends alone would have been sufficient to stimulate a significant amount of substitution among different capital assets and between capital and other inputs. However, a large part of the dramatic expansion in high-tech equipment reflected in these tables clearly should be attributable to the potential for greater cost-effectiveness from technological factors. This perception that the increasingly high-tech nature of production and the resulting extensive changes in productive processes must generate great productivity and efficiency effects has stimulated a great deal of research and discussion.
For example, Bresnahan (1986) has measured spillovers from mainframe computers in financial services; Loveman (1988) has examined interactions between information technology capital and labor productivity growth; Brynjolfsson and Bimber (1989) have evaluated the effects of information technology equipment on decentralization and firm size; Hunt and Hunt (1986) and Osterman (1986) have analyzed the impacts of computers on the employment of managers and clerical personnel; Dudley and Lasserre (1989) have researched the effects of increased information on inventory behavior; and Berndt, Morrison, and Rosenblum have explored the interactions among capital and labor composition and economic performance (Berndt and Morrison (1995) and Berndt et al. (1992) ). Wide-ranging analyses of the effects of increased office and information technology equipment have also been undertaken by Baily (1986) , Baily and Chakrabarti (1988) , Dertouzos et al. (1990) , Roach (1987), and Thurow (1987) .
These studies have explored important and interesting aspects of the ''explosion'' of high-tech capital, and some have focused on the associated productivity effects. However, these analyses have also generally been based on simple regressions of the relationships between information technology equipment and measures of productivity, input use, and other indicators of firm technology and behavior, rather than explicitly attempting to identify and quantify the cost saving benefits of high-tech investments through technology and behavioral response.
Perhaps the major studies focusing on the contribution of or returns to investment in computers, as we do in this paper, are Lichtenberg (1993) , Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1993) , and Lau and Tokutsu (1992) . The returns to capital in these studies are typically represented in terms of an output elasticity from a basic value-added production function specification and quite aggregated data (or, as in Lau and Tokutsu, are estimated using a simple dual function and then imputing the production function parameters). This approach limits the interactions represented among inputs (and the number of inputs), omits behavioral factors, and does not facilitate evaluating net returns in terms of a cost-benefit comparison. The measures generated suggest that computer equipment has an important role in explaining productivity growth and reducing the bias in estimation of the returns to private capital, through a significant production function coefficient.
A positive and significant return to this type of capital, however, does not fully address the optimality of investment or the cost effects (and therefore productivity impacts) of such investment. Measured returns to investment in information technology capital may be significant, and potentially even higher than those for other inputs in a production function framework, as found by some researchers. However, the cost-side question is how the resulting investment (and other input-demand) decisions take into account both the shadow values and the prices of each type of capital and noncapital input-how the decisions fare in terms of marginal cost-benefit comparisons.
Further exploration of the productive power, cost effects, and input composition impacts of such investments requires quantifying the input-cost-saving benefits of expanding high-tech capital relative to other capital and noncapital inputs, comparing them with the associated marginal costs, and identifying the input-specific effects. In the following sections we outline an approach to accomplish this. We construct a detailed production theory model that allows us to compute marginal benefits in terms of shadow values, and thus to compare these with the marginal costs using marginal Tobin's q-ratios. This structure and the resulting elasticity measures provide insights about the motivation underlying patterns of investment behavior, through cost savings arising from augmentation of technical change and substitution with other capital and noncapital inputs.
III. Theoretical Framework
To assess the impact on costs, productivity, and input demand of investment in O capital, we employ the economic theory of cost and production. We use a variable cost function subject to adjustment costs, of the general form G(Y, y, x, Dx, p ), where x and Dx are vectors denoting stock levels and (absolute values of) net investment 11 in fixed capital inputs (E, S, and O), p is a vector of variable input prices (N-energy, M-nonenergy intermediate materials and purchased services, and L-labor), Y is gross output, and 10 It should be noted that this pattern is related to the composition of the O capital. In all these outlier industries except electrical machinery, the instruments component of the high-tech capital stock is consequential. See Morrison (1993a) for an analysis of the primary metals and chemicals industries with the instruments capital considered separately from the office and communications equipment capital.
11 Including Dx in G allows for internal costs of adjustment on the capital assets.
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t is a time counter representing disembodied technical change. As a functional form for G(Y, t, x, Dx, p ), we use a generalized Leontief variable cost function with nonconstant returns to scale (developed by Morrison (1988) ). Six estimating equations are derived from this cost function. Three variable input demand equations are obtained by employing Shephard's lemma, v i 5 ≠G/≠p i , where v i is the short-run cost-minimizing demand for variable input i. In addition, three investment equations are constructed by specifying Euler equations representing the investment response to the deviation between the marginal cost of investment (the sum of the ex ante market price P k and the marginal adjustment costs) and the marginal benefits for each of the fixed inputs.
Specifically, as developed by Treadway (1971) , based on dynamic optimization involving the present value of expected cost minimization, the Euler equations for each capital variable have the form
where DDx k is the second difference of x k , D(Dx k ), and r is the discount rate. We append an additive disturbance term to each of the six equations, and assume that the resulting disturbance vector is identically and independently normally distributed with mean vector zero and variance-covariance matrix W. We estimate the model by three-stage least squares (3SLS), using as instruments t, the beginning-of-year capital stocks for E, S, and O, and once-lagged values of Y, E, O, S, L, N, M, P E , P S , and P O . The endogenous variables are therefore the variable input quantities L, N, and M, the investment quantities E, S, and O, and the level of output Y. 12 The variable input prices are also ''instrumented,'' since in the Euler equations it is the expectations of future prices for P L , P N , and P M that are relevant.
Instrumenting these prices, which is consistent with the generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure, ensures that expectational ''surprises'' are on average zero and are uncorrelated with the equation residuals. 13 Note, however, that measurement error problems may still arise-although the potential impact is not clear in systems estimation with cross equation constraints. Also, there is some evidence that remaining errors are time invariant and therefore uncorrelated with productivity measures (see Siegel (1995) ), even though it appears that errors in deflators could be exacerbated by increasing high-tech investment over time.
Finally, the parameters estimated from our model can be used to construct measures representing the motivations underlying investment patterns, and the linkage of investment behavior with variable input demands and technical change. Developing the conceptual basis underlying these measures involves further elaboration of equation (1).
In the absence of any adjustment costs, the optimal investment path from equation (1) would be that along which P k 5 2≠G/≠x k at all times, implying instantaneous adjustment of the x k stocks and thus identical short-and long-run equilibria. In the presence of adjustment costs, however, both the stationary state and the adjustment process are affected. That is, in a stationary long-run equilibrium where DDx k 5 Dx k 5 0, the Euler equations evaluated at this point would become
(where the subscripts denote derivatives with respect to the kth component of the x vector). So the shadow value of x k (the marginal benefits of investment, Z k 5 2≠G/≠x k ) would equal the ex ante rental price of capital P k plus the amortized marginal adjustment costs rG Dk (the marginal cost of investment). However, whenever the firm is not in long-run equilibrium, the optimal investment path from equation (1) Such a benefit-cost ratio is a capital service flow analog to the capital asset measure known as Tobin's q; q O 5 Z O /P8 O (and similarly for E and S). These q measures are fundamental for evaluating the economic rationale underlying capital 12 Note that although Y is permitted to be an endogenous explanatory variable, there is no equation explicitly determining Y. For an alternative formulation in which Y is also explicitly modeled, see Morrison (1993a) . 13 For further discussion, see Hansen and Singleton (1982) , and for an empirical implementation, Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983) .
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accumulation and thus the productivity of these investment decisions in terms of increasing cost effectiveness.
An additional measure of the productive impact of high-tech capital accumulation is its effect on the productivity of other capital, which stems from the substitutability among different capital assets-the cost-saving motivation for adapting capital composition in response to changing technological conditions. In our context we are interested in the effect of increases in O on the marginal product of other equipment. Specifically, if ≠Z E /≠O is positive (negative), then increases in O increase (decrease) the shadow value of E, making it more (less) productive in reducing variable costs and thus stimulating investment, suggesting that E and O are complements (substitutes). These substitution possibilities can be measured in elasticity form; e EO 5 (≠Z E /≠O)O/Z E .
An analogous measure may be computed to evaluate the direct impacts of office and information technology equipment on costs and productivity through its interaction with overall technical progress. If general (disembodied) technical change has a cost effect over and above the (embodied) technological impact of increasingly high-tech capital, for example, such (short-run) technical progress can be evaluated by computing the partial derivative -≠G/≠t 5 Z t . Then the effects of changes in the stock of O equipment on Z t -the interaction between high-tech capital expansion and trends in general technical progress-can be represented via the elasticity e tO 5 (≠Z t /≠O)(O/Z t ).
A final insight into the productive effect of O equipment involves the input-specific cost effects of O-capital investment, generated through the individual variable input demands. If increases in O have a ''neutral'' effect on cost-minimizing demands for L, N, and M, then changes in O would affect demands for these inputs equiproportionally. In most cases, however, one would expect changes in O to have nonneutral impacts.
If, for example, cost declines from increases in O capital stem primarily from reduced labor demand (O capital substitutes for L, or automation generates significant job losses for industrial workers) ≠ ln L /≠ ln O , 0, and this percentage decline is greater than that for overall costs
. Thus technological change (in the form of increased high-tech capital) has a labor-saving ''bias.'' To assess these patterns, we construct elasticities of the derived demand for variable inputs as e iO 5 (≠v i /≠O)O/v i .
Estimates of these measures-the q-ratios and elasticities of shadow values, technical progress, and input demand with respect to O capital-therefore provide a broad view of the pattern of impacts of high-tech capital on productivity, economic performance (cost efficiency), and input composition. In the next section we present these measures for two-digit U.S. manufacturing sectors, based on the estimated parameters of the system of equations discussed above.
IV. Data and Empirical Results
Annual two-digit manufacturing data, 1952-1991, have been provided to us by Michael Harper of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data series on Y, L, N, and M were constructed at the Bureau of Labor Statistics using data from the Census of Manufactures and the annual surveys of manufactures, and data series on capital stocks and investment for E, S, and O are based on detailed industry measures constructed by Gorman, Musgrave, and associates at the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 14 The rental price measures for the various types of capital are also based on Bureau of Labor Statistics data, modified to obtain an ex ante measure by incorporating Moody's Baa corporate bond yield as the rate of return, and setting the capital-gains term to zero. 15 We have estimated parameters in the six-equation system for each manufacturing sector using the 3SLS estimation procedure, as outlined above. Since the number of parameters estimated for each industry is substantial, in this paper we do not report detailed parameter estimates by industry. 16 Rather, we focus attention on the indicators of economic performance outlined in the previous section.
We begin with the estimated Tobin's q-ratios q k for high-tech (O) and general (E) capital, reported in table 3. Recall the interpretation of these q k measures; Z k represents the benefits or returns to investment in k capital in terms of variable input cost savings, and q k 5 Z k /P8 k shows whether these savings are sufficient to outweigh the investment costs. The ratios are reported as averages over certain time periods, 17 since the measures vary sufficiently by year that picking specific years for evaluation is not as informative.
The values for q O in table 3 exhibit interesting patterns. Although the Z O measures are invariably significantly different from zero (providing evidence of gross ''returns'' to O investment), the magnitude and significance of the benefitcost (q k ) ratios vary widely across time. From 1972 to 1991 a clear majority (14) of the industries had decreasing q-ratios for high-tech equipment; the shadow value fell faster than the price since extensive investment depressed the marginal product. However, this trend hides patterns indicating an overresponse of investment to economic incentives in the early 1980s, which began to reach a balance toward the end of our time period. This means that if one considers a 14 For discussions of data construction procedures, see Gorman et al. (1985) and Musgrave (1986) . The data set used here has been updated using procedures analogous to those outlined in these papers, with some revisions discussed in the Survey of Current Business, December 1991. For O equipment we constructed a divisia quantity index of four asset codes in the Gorman et al. data set: 14-office, computing, and accounting machinery; 16-communications equipment; 25-scientific and engineering instruments; and 26-photocopy and related equipment.
15 Discussion of rental price construction methods and references to appropriate Bureau of Labor Statistics publications are found in Harper et al. (1989) . 16 In each sector the g YY , g TY , g TT terms (and sometimes their own cross-investment terms g DkDk ) were set to zero, due to their statistical insignificance. 17 The appropriate time periods were determined by considering overall trends across industries, although some industries had slightly different ''turning points. '' The weighted averages of these values (weighted by the value of output), divided into total manufacturing, durables, and nondurables, more clearly highlight the trends. The decline in the average q O -ratio from 1.095 in the 1972-1976 period to 0.952 in the 1982-1986 period was followed by an increase to 0.980 in the 1987-1991 period. This implies that for every $1 invested in each of these industries on average in the 1982-1986 period the average reduction in variable costs would be $0.95. Hence on balance there appears to be an excessive amount of O capital in the mid-1980s-in the sense that the marginal unit of investment incurred higher costs than benefits-but the deviation was narrowing by the 1987-1991 period.
Note also that the implied overinvestment was greater in the durables than in the nondurables industries. In durables industries on average the q -ratio dropped to 0.927 and only increased to 0.937 in the final period, whereas in nondurables it only declined on average to 0.978 and then rose above 1 (1.028) by the 1987-1991 period. These differences across durables and nondurables industries are quite pervasive in all of our measures (although there are clear exceptions for specific industries).
Standard errors for the q O values were computed, although they are not straightforward to measure since the elasticity formulations contain many coefficients, each with its own distribution. It is not possible to provide these estimates for an average over a period, and they are difficult to summarize across so many industries, but a general pattern of statistical significance clearly emerged from the indexes over time. Both the late 1970s and the mid-1980s were characterized by q O values that were statistically different from 1, although between these periods the industries reached close to optimal investment rates and afterward they entered a period where investments began to ''pay off'' again. (This was less true for durable-goods industries, where the low q O levels still tended to be significantly different from 1.)
Interesting patterns in the q O -ratios therefore appear by industry, on average, and for durable-as compared to nondurable-goods industries. Why these patterns emerge is not nearly as clear, but some provocative possibilities are suggested by the observed trends. For example, the initial increase in the 1970s may be due to a slow response to the availability of new technology. As firms began to invest, a combination of momentum and a learning effect caused the short-term returns from high-tech investment to be lower than might have been expected as compared to prices, even with the declines in these prices. However, as this learning process and the required adjustments and adaptations over time were carried out, the expected returns in terms of cost savings and productivity were realized. Measures indicating the underlying linkages to other capital and noncapital First, although the trends and patterns in the q E shadow value ratios again vary by industry, the values tend to be close to 1 (usually insignificantly different from 1), with a slight increase in the 1980s (most dramatically in the 1977-1981 period) and then a slight fall at the end. The prevalence of optimal behavior suggested by the estimates (as seen particularly in the averages) is a contrast to the great fluctuations over time for O capital. Changes in capital composition from (relative) reductions in E capital appear to have been primarily cost-effective over time.
The one major (and significant) deviation from this tendency toward optimal behavior is the jump in q E in the early 1980s, which is largely driven by the electrical machinery industry (and less so by some other durablegoods industries). This may therefore be a lagged response to the increases in the value (and thus demand) for production from this industry-which includes many products in the high-tech capital category-that are implied by the q O measures.
Further evidence about the interactions among the E and O components of the capital stock may be obtained from the estimates of the elasticity of the shadow value of E capital (Z E ) with respect to changes in the quantity of O capital (e EO ), presented in the first four columns of table 4. These elasticities are presented by year instead of as averages, since the indexes are very smooth, and therefore the yearly values are representative of the trends. This also allows us to indicate statistical significance directly. Values with superscript ''a'' have t-statistics greater than 2.0.
The signs of these elasticities show no obvious pattern across industries, although the prevailing sign of the elasticities is negative, and the magnitude is in most cases increasing. Clearer implications emerge from the weighted averages at the end of the table.
In particular, the increasingly negative e EO values for the durable-goods industries indicate a tendency toward substitutability between E and O capital, which is becoming more pervasive over time. This would intensify the change in the composition of capital toward O equipment, given the very different price paths of the two types of capital. It implies that the availability of increasingly high-tech capital represses the marginal product of ''other'' equipment, motivating a major substitution away from more ''traditional'' equipment and toward high-tech equipment. Since more substitution possibilities between capital components exist in durable-goods industries, and capital is a quasi-fixed input, this suggests that the more sluggish adjustment in terms of lower and more slowly increasing q-ratios for these industries has a basis in capital adjustment costs.
Nondurable industries contrast sharply with this. The values are positive and increasing through the third time period, with a drop back to previous levels in the final period. This complementarity of O and E capital indicates less of a tendency to replace existing capital with high-tech capital, so the learning and adjustment process may proceed more quickly. 
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We can also examine interactions between O and technical progress through the e tO elasticities presented in the last columns of table 4. Recall from the previous section that (if Z t is defined as a positive number) when e tO is positive (negative), increases in the stock of O increase (decrease) the general rate of technical progress. The overall tendency of the e tO measures is to be positive (the averages are all positive), and to increase over time (particularly for durablegoods industries). This implies that rising O-capital levels increase the general rate of technical progress, as one might expect. At the end of the sample a 1% increase in O capital stimulates a 0.09% increase in overall technical progress.
In addition, for some of these industries the values are quite large-especially for the machinery industry. This is intuitively reasonable since this industry represents much of the U.S. computer production, and thus changes in the high-tech capital input alone may not be the primary driving force for technical change. However, most values are small, which should be interpreted with the understanding that the Z t measure (the decline in variable costs from disembodied technical change) is in addition to technical change embodied in the O-capital stock.
To evaluate the input-specific impact of O on variable costs, and thus the input composition impact between capital and noncapital inputs, we use the input demand elasticities e iO (i 5 L, N, M) presented in table 5. These elasticities again do not exhibit a clear sign pattern across industries, although the overriding tendency is for increasing O capital to save on materials inputs but use energy and labor inputs.
Specifically, the sign of the e LO elasticity varies by industry, with 11 industries having negative estimates (indicating substitutability between labor and O), and nine being positive (suggesting complementarity) by the end of the sample. This elasticity is generally increasing in absolute magnitude over time (whether positive or negative), indicating ever greater impacts of O capital on the demand for labor. On average, however, contrary to recent studies of technology biases, high-tech capital expansion appears to increase labor demand, and this impact has strengthened over time. This could perhaps be due to O-capital-skill complementarity, which overrides declines in demand for less skilled labor with increases in O capital. 18 In addition, it seems that most of the increase in labor demand is driven by durable industries (with clay a notable exception). The average elasticity values are always positive-and largerfor durable-goods industries as compared to nondurablegoods industries (where textiles and paper are outliers).
For energy, in nine industries e NO . 0 by the end of the sample-implying complementarity of energy with O capital-whereas for 11 it is negative. Although this suggests that O capital and energy may be generally substitutable, the weighted average of these elasticities is positive (but declining over time, suggesting some movement toward substitutability).
The wide variations in these numbers, however, hide very interesting and robust durable-nondurable goods patterns. In durable-goods industries increasing O capital seems to have supported decreases in energy demand, whereas the reverse is true in nondurable-goods industries, and both relationships are becoming stronger over time. Thus this result appears consistent with the often raised notion of ''computerinduced energy conservation'' for durable-goods industries (which tend to be more capital and energy intensive), but with energy-capital complementarity for nondurable-goods industries. 19 Materials inputs also seem substitutable with O capital. Although the elasticities are negative in only half the industries, the weighted average clearly indicates a negative relationship (that is strongest in durable-goods industries). This implies that increasingly high-tech production saves on materials inputs, which tends to contradict the generally held belief that moving toward high-tech production is conducive to ''outsourcing,'' since the materials data contain not only raw materials but also intermediate inputs and purchased services. 20
V. Concluding Remarks
Our purpose in this paper has been to examine empirically the cost-reducing impacts of recent dramatic increases in stocks of ''high-tech'' (O) office and information technology equipment in U.S. manufacturing industries through the 1970s and 1980s. We base our empirical specification of a dynamic factor demand model on the theory of cost and production, with labor, energy, and nonenergy intermediate materials as variable inputs, and O equipment, ''other'' equipment, and structures as quasi-fixed inputs. For each industry we have computed the ratio of marginal benefits of O investment to marginal costs q O , as well as a number of related elasticities highlighting different aspects of the productivity effects of high-tech capital investment.
Our principal empirical findings can be summarized as follows. First, the marginal product of O capital, as measured by shadow values, was invariably significant. However, the net returns, in the context of estimated benefit-cost (Tobin's q) ratios, varied considerably across industries and over time. The general trend across all industries was a (statistically significant) increase in the benefit-cost ratio above 1 in the late 1970s, followed by a decline that became a significant shortfall from 1 by the mid-1980s. For nondurable-goods industries this increased again to greater than 1 by the 1987-1991 period. However, the increase was more sluggish for durables-goods industries, with the average remaining at about 0.94, indicating that the positive marginal product did not compensate for the investment costs of high-tech capital on the margin at the end of the sample.
Overall, therefore, significant overinvestment appears prevalent by the mid-1980s, but then is attenuated somewhat by both decreasing prices and relatively strong marginal products later in the 1980s, to the point where in nondurables industries on average marginal investments were more than paying off. Overinvestment (possibly arising from short-term learning or adjustment difficulties, or overestimation of the expected cost reductions obtainable from O investment) appears to be a short-run phenomenon. This seems to be compensated as investment patterns move firms toward a more long-term optimal overall capital composition, although this movement seems to be less rapid in the more capital-and O-capital-intensive durable-goods industries.
The substitution patterns underlying these returns to O-capital investment indicate substitutability between O capital and materials inputs. Some substitutability is also evident between O capital and other equipment, although this appears largely for durable-goods industries, with nondurable-goods industries exhibiting increasing marginal products of E capital with the expansion of high-tech capital.
O capital also appears to be generally complementary with labor and energy (although energy-capital substitutability appears stronger in durable-goods industries).
These patterns, however, vary greatly across industries. This may be linked to the greater substitutability of O capital with labor in nondurable than in durable-goods industries, and the greater complementarity over time found overall, as the labor force in manufacturing attains higher educational levels. It may also be related to differing capital intensities across industries. In addition, in most cases these elasticities increase in absolute magnitude over time, indicating ever greater impacts of O capital on the use of other inputs.
